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AL BAHLUL V. UNITED STATES: THE 
CONSPIRACY BEHIND THE CONSPIRACY 
OFFENSE IN U.S. MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
Brianna Edwards∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
Approximately seven years after the tragic events on 
September 11, 2001, a U.S. military commission tried and convicted 
Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman Al Bahlul (Al Bahlul) for his 
involvement in the preparation and planning of the terrorist attacks.1 
As Al Qaeda’s lead propagandist and secretary of public relations, Al 
Bahlul assisted Osama bin Laden in recruiting jihadists, most notably 
two of the September 11 hijackers. For these reasons, military 
prosecutors charged Al Bahlul under the Military Commissions Act 
of 2006 (2006 MCA)2 for conspiring to commit war crimes, 
providing material support for terrorism, and soliciting others to 
commit war crimes.3 The military commission found him guilty of 
all three offenses and sentenced him to life imprisonment.4 
After the United States Court of Military Commission Review 
(CMCR) affirmed his convictions and sentence, Al Bahlul appealed 
his convictions to the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit), arguing the military commission 
lacked jurisdiction to try the offenses because the crimes were not 
∗  J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Political Science,
University of California, Irvine, June 2012. I would like to thank Professor David Glazier for 
sparking my interest in this fascinating area of law, and Professor Robert Brain for his continual 
guidance, support, and feedback on this Comment. I am also truly grateful to the editors and 
staffers of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their incredible work on this Issue. Finally, I 
would like to dedicate this Comment to my loving family for their endless support and 
encouragement, and without whom my education would not have been possible. 
1. See United States v. Al Bahlul (Al Bahlul I), 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1156–57 (C.M.C.R.
2011). 
2. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-336, 120 Stat. 2600.
3. Al Bahlul v. United States (Al Bahlul II), 767 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
4. Id. at 7–8.
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recognized under the international laws of war when committed.5 
Upon en banc review, the D.C. Circuit applied the plain-error 
standard of review to Al Bahlul’s jurisdictional challenge and 
affirmed his conspiracy conviction.6 The majority reasoned it was 
“not obvious” that the statute conferring jurisdiction to military 
commissions was limited to international law of war offenses.7 In 
doing so, the D.C. Circuit concluded “the historical practice of [U.S.] 
wartime tribunals [was] sufficient” to suggest that the military 
commission could try Al Bahlul for conspiracy to commit war 
crimes.8 
The D.C. Circuit then correctly determined material support and 
solicitation were not traditionally triable by military commission and, 
as such, were not offenses at the time of Al Bahlul’s conduct.9 
Therefore, it proceeded to vacate Al Bahlul’s convictions for 
material support and solicitation, agreeing with his argument that 
both constituted plain ex post facto violations.10 
This Comment argues the D.C. Circuit erred in upholding Al 
Bahlul’s inchoate conspiracy conviction because such an offense is 
not recognized by the international laws of war and therefore not 
triable by military commission. Part II provides the factual and 
procedural background of Al Bahlul’s case. Part III discusses the 
D.C. Circuit’s majority opinion of the Al Bahlul II decision, as well
as its reasoning in reaching its rulings. Part IV provides the historical
framework and development of the law that is implicated in this
decision. Part V examines the D.C. Circuit’s error in affirming Al
Bahlul’s conspiracy conviction, particularly its failure to adequately
consider its own reasoning from a recent decision as well as the
congressional intent behind the 2006 MCA. Finally, Part VI
summarizes the main points of this Comment’s discussion.
5. Id. at 8.
6. Id. at 5.
7. Id. at 24.
8. Id. at 27.
9. Id. at 29–31.
10. Id. at 31.
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual Background of Al Bahlul’s Case
In the late 1990s, Al Bahlul left his native country of Yemen to 
join al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan, where he completed his military 
training and swore an oath of allegiance to Osama bin Laden.11 
Shortly after the al Qaeda members attacked the U.S.S. Cole on 
October 12, 2000, Al Bahlul, at the instruction of bin Laden, created 
and distributed a propaganda video that included footage of the 
bombings and called for a jihad against the United States.12 
Bin Laden later promoted Al Bahlul to his personal assistant and 
secretary for public relations, a position in which Al Bahlul secured 
loyalty oaths from and prepared “martyr wills” for Mohamed Atta 
and Ziad al Jarrah, two of the September 11 hijackers.13 Deemed 
“too important” to the cause to participate in the September 11 
attacks, Al Bahlul evacuated al Qaeda’s Kandahar headquarters 
alongside bin Laden and other senior al Qaeda members in the days 
preceding the attacks.14 
After September 11, Bin Laden instructed Al Bahlul to 
investigate and report the findings of the economic impact of the 
attacks.15 However, in December 2001, Al Bahlul fled to Pakistan 
where he was eventually captured.16 After being transferred into the 
custody of U.S. authorities, he was transported in early 2002 to the 
U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where he has since been 
detained pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military 
Force (AUMF).17 
11. Id. at 5.
12. Id. at 5–6.




17. Id.; see Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat.
224 (2001) (authorizing the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001”). 
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B. Procedural History
Invoking his powers under the AUMF and Article 21 of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (“Section 821”),18 
President Bush “establish[ed] military commissions to try ‘members 
of . . . al Qaida’ and others who ‘engaged in, aided or abetted, or 
conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or acts in 
preparation therefor.’”19 In 2004, military prosecutors charged Al 
Bahlul with conspiracy to commit war crimes after President Bush 
deemed him eligible for trial by military commission.20 Yet, those 
proceedings were stayed pending the Supreme Court determination 
of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,21 a case in which another detainee 
challenged the “lawfulness of his trial by military commission.”22 
In Hamdan I, “the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the system 
of military commissions used by the Bush Administration to 
prosecute detainees at Guantánamo for alleged war crimes.”23 
Specifically, the Supreme Court found the military commission 
lacked power to try the detainee’s case “because its structure and 
procedures violate[d] both the UCMJ and Geneva Conventions.”24 In 
response, Congress adopted the 2006 MCA, which codified thirty 
offenses triable by military commission and “conferred jurisdiction 
on military commissions to try [such offenses] . . . ‘when committed 
by an alien unlawful enemy combatant before, on, or after 
September 11, 2001.’”25 
Approximately two years later, the charges against Al Bahlul 
were amended to embody three offenses set forth in the 2006 MCA: 
conspiracy to commit war crimes, providing material support for 
terrorism, and solicitation of others to commit war crimes.26 Despite 
admitting to the factual allegations against him (except to the 
suggestion that he wore a suicide belt), Al Bahlul pleaded not guilty 
to the charges, “deny[ing] the legitimacy of the military 
18. See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000) (granting military commissions jurisdiction over “offenders
or offenses that by statute or the law of war may be tried by military commission”). 
19. Al Bahlul II, 767 F.3d at 6 (ellipsis in original).
20. Id.
21. (Hamdan I), 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
22. Al Bahlul II, 767 F.3d at 6.
23. James G. Vanzant, Note, No Crime Without Law: War Crimes Material Support or
Terrorism and the Ex Post Facto Principle, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1053, 1057 (2010). 
24. Hamdan I, 548 U.S. at 567.
25. Al Bahlul II, 767 F.3d at 6–7 (quoting 10 U.S.C. §§ 950t–950v (2006)).
26. Id. at 7.
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commission.”27 Having “waived all pretrial motions, asked no 
questions during voir dire, made no objections to prosecution 
evidence, presented no defense and declined to make opening and 
closing statements,” the military commission convicted Al Bahlul of 
all three offenses and sentenced him to confinement for life.28 The 
CMCR affirmed Al Bahlul’s conviction and sentence, following 
which he appealed to the D.C. Circuit.29 
While Al Bahlul’s petition for appeal was pending, the D.C. 
Circuit, in another case, “interpret[ed] the [2006 MCA] so that it 
does not authorize retroactive prosecution for conduct committed 
before enactment of that Act unless the conduct was already 
prohibited under existing U.S. law as a war crime triable by military 
commission.”30 In Hamdan II, the court vacated Hamdan’s 
conviction for material support for terrorism because it was not a 
preexisting offense triable by military commission.31 Shortly after, 
“the Government conceded that Hamdan II’s reasoning required 
vacatur of all three of Bahlul’s convictions.”32 In light of that 
concession, the D.C. Circuit vacated Al Bahlul’s convictions.33 
However, the Government later petitioned for a rehearing en banc, 
which the D.C. Circuit granted.34 
III. DISPOSITION OF THE COURT
In this appeal, Al Bahlul requested the court to interpret the 
2006 MCA as “mak[ing] triable by military commission only those 
crimes that were recognized under the international law of war when 
committed.”35 Additionally, he argued “law of war” as set forth in 
Section 821 implies international law of war.36 
Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson, writing for the majority of the 
court, adopted the “plain error” standard in reviewing Al Bahlul’s 
convictions.37 She determined Al Bahlul forfeited the arguments he 
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 8.
30. Hamdan v. United States (Hamdan II), 696 F.3d 1238, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2012).





36. Id. at 22–23.
37. Id. at 9–10.
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raised on appeal because “he flatly refused to participate in the 
military commission proceedings and instructed his trial counsel not 
to present a substantive defense.”38 Combined with the 
Government’s specific request for a plain error standard,39 the 
majority concluded his convictions would be reviewed for plain error 
only.40 
In examining Al Bahlul’s jurisdictional challenge to his 
conspiracy charge, the majority found domestic wartime precedent 
“provide[d] sufficient historical pedigree to sustain Bahlul’s 
conviction on plain-error review.”41 In its domestic precedential 
analysis, the majority referred to the trial of the conspirators of the 
Abraham Lincoln assassination,42 the prosecution of Nazi saboteurs 
who had entered the United States with the intent to destroy 
industrial facilities,43 and the military order of General Douglas 
MacArthur during the Korean War which called for the prosecution 
by military commission of those accused of conspiracy to commit 
violations of the laws of war.44 Despite acknowledging the 
overwhelming Supreme Court precedent that interprets Section 821 
and its predecessors as conferring jurisdiction to military 
commissions over “international law of war” offenses,45 Judge 
Henderson concluded “the historical practice of our wartime 
tribunals is sufficient to make it not ‘obvious’ that conspiracy was 
not traditionally triable by law-of-war military commission under 
section 821.”46 Therefore, the majority affirmed Al Bahlul’s 
conviction for conspiracy to commit war crimes, but overturned his 
material support and solicitation convictions.47 
38. Id. at 10.
39. Id. at 11.
40. Id. at 10.
41. Id. at 24.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 26.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 22–23.
46. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 5.
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IV. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE LAW 
Historically, there are three situations in which military 
commissions have been used.48 First, in times and areas of martial 
law, military commissions have been substituted for civilian courts.49 
Second, military commissions have been implemented as temporary 
institutions to try civilians in territories occupied by the U.S. 
military.50 Lastly, and the type of commission at issue here, are those 
established “as an ‘incident to the conduct of war’ when there is a 
need ‘to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies 
who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have 
violated the law of war.’”51 
International law scholars argue the military commission that 
prosecuted Al Bahlul, “as [a] law-of-war tribunal[], [is] legally 
limited to prosecuting offenses recognized by the international law 
regulating armed conflict.”52 As Judge Judith W. Rogers noted in her 
dissenting opinion, the majority deviated from seventy years of 
Supreme Court precedent, which has interpreted the “law of war” to 
mean the international law of war.53 By relying solely on domestic 
precedent in its analysis, the court ignored overwhelming legal 
authority that strongly suggests the notion that “conspiracy” has 
never been and is not now an offense recognized in international 
law.54 
A. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Section 821’s
“Law of War” 
Like Article 15 of the Articles of War (“Article 15”),55 its 
predecessor, Section 821 grants jurisdiction to military commissions 
48. Hamdan I, 548 U.S. 557, 595 (2006).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 595–96.
51. Id. at 596 (quoting Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1942)).
52. David Glazier, The Misuse of History: Conspiracy and the Guantanamo Military
Commissions, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 295, 301 (2014); see Brief for International Law Scholars as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 
11-1324), 2014 WL 3437485.
53. Al Bahlul II, 767 F.3d 1, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Rogers, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). 
54. See id. at 39.
55. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27 (stating “Article 15 declares that ‘the provisions of
these articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial shall not be construed as depriving 
military commissions . . . or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of 
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over “offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may 
be tried by military commission.”56 When military prosecutors 
charged Al Bahlul, only two offenses provided by statute existed: 
spying and aiding the enemy.57 Military prosecutors did not charge 
Al Bahlul with these statutory offenses.58 Therefore, the military 
commission “had jurisdiction only over violations triable by military 
commission under the law of war.”59 
For an offense “[t]o come within the ‘law of war’ under 
Section 821, [it] must constitute both a violation of the international 
law of war and a violation of the law of war as traditionally 
recognized in U.S. military commissions.”60 Since the aftermath of 
World War II, the Supreme Court has adopted and reaffirmed this 
particular definition of “law of war.” 
First, in 1942 the Supreme Court interpreted the law of war, as 
set forth in Article 15, “as including that part of the law of nations 
which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties 
of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals.”61 In Quirin, four 
German petitioners were charged with various violations of the laws 
of war for entering the United States with the intent to destroy war 
industries and facilities as ordered by the German High Command.62 
In determining whether the president had authority to order that the 
petitioners be tried by military commission, the Court stated a charge 
falls within the “law of war” under Article 15 if it “has been so 
recognized in practice both here and abroad, and has so generally 
been accepted as valid by authorities on international law.”63 
Similarly, just a few years later in In re Yamashita, the Supreme 
Court intimated that “law of war” implies both domestic and 
international law in reviewing a military commission’s jurisdiction to 
prosecute a commander of the Japanese Imperial Army.64 There, the 
offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military 
commissions”). 
56. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
57. Al Bahlul II, 767 F.3d at 37 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
10 U.S.C. §§ 904, 906 (2000)). 
58. Id.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 42.
61. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1942).
62. Id. at 21–23.
63. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
64.  See generally In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1946).
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Court “looked to the violations of the law of war ‘recognized in 
international law’ and consulted the Hague Conventions and Geneva 
Conventions.”65 Specifically, the Yamashita Court concluded that by 
referencing the law of war, Article 15 “adopted the system of 
military common law applied by military tribunals” which is 
“defined and supplemented by the Hague Convention.”66 
Last, and most recently, in 2006 the Supreme Court in Hamdan I 
concluded Section 821 “conditions the President’s use of military 
commissions on compliance not only with the American common 
law of war, but also with . . . the ‘rules and precepts of the law of 
nations.’”67 Additionally, the Court noted that an act constitutes a 
law of war offense if by “universal agreement and practice” it is 
recognized as such both domestically and internationally.68 
B. International Law and the Conspiracy Offense
The D.C. Circuit affirmed Al Bahlul’s conspiracy conviction 
despite the notion that “[m]ost law-of-war scholars (and four 
Supreme Court justices) agree that the Anglo-American concept of 
conspiracy as an inchoate offense . . . is not a recognized war crime 
under international law.”69 In fact, the plurality in Hamdan I 
“unequivocally found that . . . there was no evidence that conspiracy 
had ever constituted a recognized offense under the customary laws 
of war.”70 
There is an international law principle that provides “criminal 
guilt is personal, and that mass punishment should be avoided.”71 
International tribunals and treaty law have supported and strongly 
reinforced this principle by refusing to acknowledge conspiracy as a 
law of war offense.72 First, conspiracy is an offense that is unique to 
Anglo-American law and, therefore, “is absent from all major law of 
65. Al Bahlul II, 767 F.3d at 37 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 14–16). 
66. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8.
67. Hamdan I, 548 U.S. 557, 613 (2006) (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28).
68. Id. at 603 (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30).
69. Glazier, supra note 52, at 297.
70. Alexandra Link, Trying Terrorism: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Material Support, and the
Paradox of International Criminal Law, 34 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 439, 440 (2013). 
71. Al Bahlul II, 767 F.3d 1, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Rogers, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (internal quotations omitted). 
72. Id.
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war treaties, including the Geneva and Hague Conventions.”73 
Second, the crime of conspiracy has been explicitly rejected in 
international criminal tribunals,74 most famously in the Nuremburg 
Trials,75 because “[t]he charge is overbroad” and therefore has the 
potential to “assign criminal liability to persons who are not 
responsible for committing war crimes.”76 Third, international 
statutes that define law of war offenses do not include conspiracy to 
commit those offenses, apart from the crime of genocide.77 It is also 
important to note that in 1949 the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission pointedly referenced the fact that United States Military 
Tribunals “did ‘not recognize as a separate offence conspiracy to 
commit war crimes or crimes against humanity.’”78 Accordingly, 
these international sources confirm conspiracy is not a recognizable 
violation of the law of war, and therefore cannot be prosecuted by a 
military commission.79 
V. THE D.C. CIRCUIT ERRED IN AFFIRMING AL BAHLUL’S
CONSPIRACY CONVICTION 
In Hamdan I, the Supreme Court provided that “[a]t a minimum, 
the Government must make a substantial showing that the crime for 
which it seeks to try a defendant by military commission is 
acknowledged to be an offense against the law of war.”80 The D.C. 
Circuit not only departed from decades of Supreme Court precedent 
in upholding Al Bahlul’s conspiracy conviction, but also dispensed 
from its very own reasoning in recent decisions. For one, in 2012 the 
D.C. Circuit acknowledged in Hamdan II that “law of war” under
Section 821 “has long been understood to mean the international law
73. Brief for International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
52, at 2; see Al Bahlul II, 767 F.3d at 39 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
74. Brief for International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
52, at 2. 
75. See Hamdan I, 548 U.S. 557, 610 (2005) (stating “[t]he International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, over the prosecution’s objections, pointedly refused to recognize as a violation of the 
law of war conspiracy to commit war crimes”). 
76. Brief for International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
52, at 2–3. 
77. See Al Bahlul II, 767 F.3d at 40 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. Brief for International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note
52, at 8 (quoting 15 WAR CRIMES COMM’N, UNITED NATIONS, LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS 90 (1949)). 
79. Hamdan I, 548 U.S. at 610.
80. Id. at 603 (emphasis added).
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of war.”81 Additionally, in 2013 the D.C. Circuit affirmed its 
Hamdan II interpretation in Ali v. United States,82 stating “we are 
mindful that ‘imposing liability on the basis of a violation of . . . ‘law 
of war’ generally must be based on norms firmly grounded in 
international law.’”83 
Despite these findings, the D.C. Circuit relied solely on 
domestic precedent in affirming Al Bahlul’s inchoate conspiracy 
conviction, “stretch[ing] the use of history beyond its credible 
limits.”84 In doing so, the court failed to adequately consider its 
reasoning from the Ali decision, which was proffered by Al Bahlul’s 
counsel in support of his position. Furthermore, the majority’s sole 
reliance on domestic precedent deviated from Congress’s intent, as 
set forth in the 2006 MCA’s statement of purpose and intent. For 
these reasons, the D.C. Circuit erred in upholding Al Bahlul’s 
conspiracy conviction. 
A. Conspiracy to Commit Piracy Is Analogous to
 Conspiracy to Commit War Crimes 
Al Bahlul presented Ali, a case decided by the D.C. Circuit just a 
year prior, to the court in support of his position, arguing “[n]o court 
has ever suggested that there is a domestic body of common law 
crimes that can be applied extraterritorially and in the absence of any 
statutory mandate for their judicial creation.”85 
In Ali, a U.S. grand jury indicted a Somali national under a 
federal statute for conspiracy to commit piracy.86 Ali, the petitioner, 
was alleged to have participated in the capture of a merchant vessel 
on the high seas with the purpose to negotiate large sums of money 
81. Hamdan II, 696 F.3d 1238, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
82. 718 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
83. Id. at 942 (quoting Hamdan II, 696 F.3d at 1250 n.10).
84. Glazier, supra note 52, at 297; see id. at 299 (stating “careful scrutiny of the historical
record shows that it does not actually support the conclusion that past U.S. military commissions 
prosecuted inchoate conspiracies as a war crime”). 
85. En Banc Reply Brief for Petitioner at 12, Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (No. 11-1324), 2013 WL 4036477. 
86. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (“If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense against
the United States . . . in any manner thereof or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons 
do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned . . . or both.”). 
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as ransom from the vessel’s owner.87 In that decision, the D.C. 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Ali’s conspiracy to 
commit the piracy offense, concluding the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to prosecute him on that charge.88 First, the D.C. Circuit 
agreed with the district court that the federal conspiracy statute did 
not apply extraterritorially.89 Second, the court reasoned the 
international statute granting universal jurisdiction to domestic courts 
to try individuals for the offense of piracy did not include by its plain 
language the offense of conspiracy to commit piracy.90 In affirming 
the dismissal of Ali’s conspiracy charge, the D.C. Circuit stated, 
“[i]nternational law does not permit the government’s abortive use of 
universal jurisdiction to charge Ali with conspiracy.”91 
In short, the D.C. Circuit determined that prosecuting Ali for 
conspiracy to commit piracy would be inconsistent with international 
law. Such reasoning is not only applicable to Al Bahlul’s case, but 
should have resulted in the vacatur of his conspiracy conviction. 
Ironically, the case for vacating Al Bahlul’s conspiracy charge is 
significantly stronger than the one for dismissing Ali’s conspiracy 
charge. Historically, piracy has been considered a serious 
international offense to the extent that international statutes grant 
nation-states universal jurisdiction to prosecute anyone who commits 
the offense.92 Despite this, the D.C. Circuit refused to extend such 
jurisdiction to encompass conspiracy to commit piracy.93 
In Al Bahlul II, the court held the complete opposite of Ali, 
extending its jurisdiction to cover an offense that has repeatedly been 
rejected by international legal authorities, as well as by the Supreme 
87. Ali, 718 F.3d at 933. As a “pirate hostage negotiator,” Ali secured a $1.7 million ransom
from the owners of the vessel to be given to the pirates (in which he received a $16,500 share), as 
well as $75,000 in “payment for his assistance.” Id. 
88. Id. at 942.
89. Id. at 941–42.
90. Id. at 942 (“UNCLOS’s plain language does not include conspiracy to commit piracy.”);
see S.C. Res. 2020, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011). 
91. Ali, 718 F.3d at 942.
92. See Tara Helfman, Marauders in the Courts: Why the Federal Courts Have Got the
Problem of Maritime Piracy (Partly) Wrong, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53 (2012). “Piracy has aptly 
been described as ‘the original [universal] jurisdiction crime.’ . . . Under customary international 
law, any state may assert jurisdiction over a pirate because he is hostis humani genera, the enemy 
of all humankind, a judicial classification that has existed for millennia.” Id. at 55–56; see 
generally Daniel A. Lavrisha, Pirates Ye Be Warned: A Comparative Analysis of National Piracy 
Laws, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 255 (2010) (offering a comparative analysis of piracy laws, Lavrisha 
notes the commonality among nations of granting universal anti-piracy enforcement jurisdiction). 
93. See generally Ali, 718 F.3d at 929.
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Court.94 It ignored the notion that law of war violations must be 
recognized “both here and abroad,”95 and wrongfully interpreted the 
rare instances of domestic precedent as being enough to prosecute Al 
Bahlul for conspiracy to commit war crimes.96 This alone suffices to 
illustrate the D.C. Circuit’s error in affirming Al Bahlul’s inchoate 
conspiracy conviction. 
B. The Purpose and Intent of the 2006 MCA
As the D.C. Circuit stated in Ali, “an Act of Congress ought 
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other 
possible construction remains.”97 The D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of 
the 2006 MCA as conferring jurisdiction to the military commission 
to try Al Bahlul for inchoate conspiracy is clearly inconsistent with 
the law of nations. However, it is not necessary to examine other 
possible constructions of the 2006 MCA because Congress 
unequivocally provided its intent in the 2006 MCA. Rather, the D.C. 
Circuit failed to adequately consider the statement of purpose and 
intent, which reads as follows: 
(a) PURPOSE.—The provisions of this subchapter codify
offenses that have traditionally been triable by military
commissions. This chapter does not establish new crimes
that did not exist before its enactment, but rather codifies
those crimes for trial by military commission.
(b) EFFECT.—Because the provisions of this subchapter
(including provisions that incorporate definitions in other
provisions of law) are declarative of existing law, they do
not preclude trial for crimes that occurred before the date of
the enactment of this chapter.98
As Judge Rogers stated, “[t]he reference in Congress’s plain and
unequivocal statement of purpose to offenses that have traditionally 
been triable by military commissions, clearly indicates its intent to 
confine military commissions to their traditional role and 
jurisdiction.”99 Therefore, the only thing left to determine is whether 
94. See generally Al Bahlul II, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
95. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1942).
96. See Glazier, supra note 52, at 299.
97. Ali, 718 F.3d at 935 (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Al Bahlul II, 767 F.3d at 35–36 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting 10 U.S.C. § 950p (2006)). 
99. Id. at 36 (internal quotations omitted).
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conspiracy is an offense against the law of war, which is a question 
of international law.100 Because it has been established that 
conspiracy is not an offense recognized by international law of war, 
the D.C. Circuit departed from congressional intent by relying solely 
on domestic precedent in upholding Al Bahlul’s conspiracy 
conviction. 
C. The Implications of the Al Bahlul Decision
Military commissions are essential institutions to the American 
justice system, particularly in times of war where individuals have 
great opportunity to commit war crimes and other law of war 
violations. However, there is great concern—and rightly so—over 
the use of Guantánamo Bay military commissions to prosecute 
individuals for acts of terrorism. Some have argued that Article III 
courts, which have tried five hundred terrorism-related cases since 
September 11, are better suited for the task.101 The outcome of the Al 
Bahlul II decision clearly supports this argument. 
As of August 2014, 122 detainees at Guantánamo Bay were 
being held pursuant to the AUMF, were awaiting transfer or trial, or 
were serving their sentences.102 At that time, seven detainees had 
been convicted of similar charges to Al Bahlul,103 while dozens of 
others had been recommended for prosecution or indefinite detention 
or both.104 In light of the Al Bahlul II decision, David Hicks, who has 
already served his sentence after being convicted for providing 
material support for terrorism,105 filed a motion to vacate his 
conviction.106 
100. See Brief for International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra
note 52, at 14. 
101. Laura Pitter, 13 Years on, Will 9/11 Ever Go to Trial?, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 28,
2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/28/13-years-will-911-ever-go-trial; see generally Steve 
Vladeck, Why Article III Matters: A Reply to Peter Margulies on Al Bahlul, LAWFARE (Sept. 30, 
2014, 10:23 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/09/why-article-iii-matters-a-reply-to-peter 
-margulies-on-al-bahlul/.
102. See The Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/Guantanamo
/detainees (last visited Jan. 28, 2015); The Guantanamo Trials, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 30, 
2015, 4:40 AM), http://www.hrw.org/features/guantanamo. 
103. The Guantanamo Trials, supra note 102.
104. Guantánamo by the Numbers, HUM. RTS. FIRST (last updated Mar. 27, 2015),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/gtmo-by-the-numbers.pdf. 
105. First Gitmo Conviction Invalidated By New Ruling, Attorneys Say, CTR. FOR CONST.
RTS. (Aug. 20, 2014), http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/first-gitmo-conviction 
-invalidated-new-ruling,-attorneys-say; see The Guantanamo Trials, supra note 102.
106. First Gitmo Conviction Invalidated By New Ruling, Attorneys Say, supra note 105.
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Thirteen years have passed since the dreadful attacks on 
September 11. The prolonged process of prosecuting Guantánamo 
detainees, coupled with its “tainted history,” continues to hamper the 
legitimacy of the judgments of the military commissions both 
domestically and abroad.107 With verdicts and decisions periodically 
being overturned, there is great uncertainty in the prosecution of 
these individuals that may not have existed had they been tried by 
Article III courts. As Laura Pitter of the Human Rights Watch states, 
“[t]he al-Bahlul decision shows why creating a substandard system 
of justice, with new rules and charges never before contemplated by 
a US court, was always a bad idea.”108 Using the Guantánamo 
commissions to try terrorism charges, she added, “is not worth the 
very real risk that verdicts may get overturned on appeal.”109 In 
affirming the conspiracy charge, which has never been considered a 
law of war offense, and vacating material support and solicitation, Al 
Bahlul “dealt [another] major blow to the legitimacy of [the 
Guantánamo] military commissions.”110 
VI. CONCLUSION
Though it may have been difficult to exonerate Al Bahlul, the 
D.C. Circuit should have vacated his conspiracy conviction alongside
his material support and solicitation convictions, because the United
States, as a nation of laws, is built on the principle that “the rule of
law . . . is preferable to that of any individual.”111
Prior to Al Bahlul, “no U.S. court has ever upheld the 
jurisdiction of a military tribunal to try an offense that that court 
believed to be a violation of the domestic—but not international—
laws of war.”112 As noted above, the majority opinion deviated from 
seventy years of Supreme Court precedent and international legal 
authority in affirming Al Bahlul’s conspiracy conviction. It also 
107. See Pitter, supra note 101.





111. RANDALL R. CURREN, ARISTOTLE ON THE NECESSITY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 73 (2000)
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departed from its very own reasoning in recent decisions, most 
notably Ali and Hamdan II. In ignoring the notion that law of war 
implies offenses recognized “both here and abroad,”113 the D.C. 
Circuit upheld his conviction relying solely on domestic precedent in 
its law of war analysis. This error expanded the military 
commission’s jurisdiction to try conspiracy that, contrary to the 
majority’s opinion, has not been traditionally triable by military 
commission. Lastly, Al Bahlul highlights the concerns many share 
regarding the legitimacy of the military commissions and supports 
the argument that Article III courts are better suited to prosecute 
terrorism offenses. 
113. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1942).
